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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Three witnesses appeal from the final order of the District 
Court holding them in civil contempt and ordering them 
confined for refusing to testify before a grand jury 
investigating their father. The witnesses justify their refusal 
to testify on religious grounds and contend that the District 
Court failed to follow the procedures mandated by the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. 
SS 2000bb to 2000bb-4. This appears to be thefirst Court 
of Appeals decision to consider the application of that Act 
to a grand jury subpoena. 
 
I. 
 
A federal grand jury is currently sitting in Newark, New 
Jersey, to investigate various crimes allegedly committed by 
an Orthodox Jewish Rabbi. Between August and September 
1998, the government subpoenaed three of the Rabbi's 
daughters to testify before the grand jury concerning, inter 
alia, the roles of the witnesses as employees of their father. 
By mutual agreement, the return date of the subpoenas 
was eventually adjourned until October 29, 1998. On 
October 27, 1998, the District Court issued an order 
immunizing the witnesses in order to overcome any Fifth 
Amendment obstacle to their giving testimony. The next 
day, the witnesses responded by filing a Motion to Quash, 
which the government opposed by memorandum submitted 
on the following day. In support of its opposition, the 
government filed with the court, ex parte and in camera, a 
Schofield affidavit, see generally In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973), setting 
forth the nature of the grand jury proceedings and the 
government's interest in and need for the witnesses' 
testimony. 
 
The District Court denied the motion to quash. It also 
denied the request made on behalf of the witnesses for an 
evidentiary hearing and for an opportunity to review the 
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government's Schofield affidavit. On October 29, 1998, the 
court ordered the witnesses to comply with the subpoenas. 
All three witnesses appeared before the grand jury but 
refused to testify on the ground that to do so would violate 
their deeply held religious beliefs. The same day, the 
District Court held each in contempt and ordered them 
remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal for 
the duration of the term of the grand jury. The court stayed 
its imprisonment order pending an expedited appeal, and 
the witnesses filed a Notice of Appeal on November 4, 1998. 
On November 18, 1998, the District Court issued a written 
opinion describing the earlier proceedings and explaining 
its oral decisions of October 29, 1998. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. S 3231. This court has jurisdiction to consider 
the witnesses' appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We expedited 
our hearing and consideration. 
 
II. 
 
In 1963, the Supreme Court stated, "[A]ny incidental 
burden [a statute imposes] on the free exercise of . . . 
religion may be justified by a `compelling state interest in 
the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional 
power to regulate.' " Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 
(1963) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 
(1963)). As the Court further explained in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972), "activities of individuals, 
even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation 
by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to 
promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the 
Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated 
powers." However, the Court noted, "only those interests of 
the highest order and those not otherwise served can 
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of 
religion." Id. at 215. We, along with the other courts, 
interpreted these passages to mean that a statute that 
imposed an incidental burden on religion would survive 
First Amendment scrutiny only if it were the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest. 
See, e.g., United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 772 (3d 
Cir. 1983). 
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The Supreme Court called the validity of this prevalent 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause into significant 
doubt in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). There it held, 
"[the] right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of 
the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes 
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes)." Id. at 879 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 
It is against this background that Congress enacted the 
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act. In so doing, 
Congress stated, "laws `neutral' toward religion may burden 
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere 
with religious exercise." 42 U.S.C. S 2000bb(a)(2). It thus 
attempted "to restore the compelling interest test as set 
forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder." Id. 
S 2000bb(b)(1) (citations omitted). 
 
Thereafter, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997), the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as 
applied to the actions of a local zoning authority, based in 
part on the Tenth Amendment. Courts have since disagreed 
over whether RFRA is constitutional as applied to the 
federal government. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical 
Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 860-61 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
119 S. Ct. 43 (1998); United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 
792 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997); cf. United States v. Muhammad, 
165 F.3d 327, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999) (declining to consider 
in the first instance on appeal argument that RFRA 
protected federal prisoner from involuntary civil 
commitment for psychiatric treatment). In our recent 
decision in Adams v. CIR, No. 98-7200, 1999 WL 111126 
(3d Cir. March 4, 1999), we noted the issue, but assumed 
without deciding that RFRA is constitutional as applied to 
the federal government. Here also, we need not decide 
whether any part of RFRA survives Flores, because we 
conclude that the federal government's actions in this case 
would survive constitutional scrutiny even under the 
rigorous RFRA standard. 
 
                                4 
  
III. 
 
RFRA states, in relevant part: 
 
       (a) In general 
 
        Government shall not substantially burden a 
       person's exercise of religion even if the burden results 
       from a rule of general applicability, except as provided 
       in subsection (b) of this section. 
 
       (b) Exception 
 
        Government may substantially burden a person's 
       exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
       application of the burden to the person -- 
 
       (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
       interest; and 
 
       (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
       compelling governmental interest. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000bb-1. Thus, once a party has shown that 
the application of a neutral law substantially burdens his 
or her religion, the government bears the burden of proving 
that enforcement of the law is the least restrictive means of 
advancing a compelling state interest. 
 
The witnesses argue (1) that the District Court failed to 
properly apply RFRA by underestimating the burden that 
forcing them to testify will place on their free exercise of 
religion, (2) that the government failed to prove that its 
interest in securing their testimony is compelling, and (3) 
that enforcing the subpoenas is not the least restrictive 
means of furthering whatever interest the government may 
have. We consider each issue in turn. 
 
A. 
 
The witnesses contend that their religion, Orthodox 
Judaism, prohibits them from providing testimony to be 
used against their father. The prohibition, they explain, 
stems from the commandment of the Old Testament, 
"Honor thy father and thy mother." In support, they cite the 
affirmation of Rabbi Feivel Cohen, the family's Decisor,1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As the witnesses explain, "A Decisor makes religious rulings on 
matters of religious significance and these rulings are binding on the 
observant Orthodox Jew." Appellants' Br. at 5. 
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which was submitted together with the Motion to Quash, to 
the effect that it would be "a fundamental sin which cannot 
be expunged on Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement)" for the 
children to "testify[ ] before members of the public in order 
to provide the prosecutors evidence to be used against their 
father." App. at 12. 
 
The District Court expressed some skepticism about 
whether Jewish tenets in general, or the witnesses' religious 
beliefs in particular, actually prohibit them from testifying 
before the grand jury. See App. at 60 n.1. For purposes of 
decision, however, it "accept[ed] the religious beliefs of the 
witnesses as such." App. at 60. 
 
The witnesses argue on appeal that, in expressing such 
skepticism, the District Court underestimated the burden 
that enforcement of the subpoenas will place on the 
witnesses' practice of their religion.2  The witnesses contend, 
"To the extent the district court determined that the weight 
to be accorded the religious burden was lightened by these 
factors, it was inappropriate and the judgment below 
should be vacated." Appellants' Br. at 38. They further note 
that the District Court improperly described the burden on 
their religion as "incidental." Appellants' Br. at 36. 
 
The witnesses misapprehend the District Court's use of 
the term "incidental" in this context. It was used in 
precisely this manner by the Supreme Court in Smith, 
where the Court said: 
 
       [I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the 
       activity of printing) is not the object of the tax but 
       merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
       and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment 
       has not been offended. 
 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 
As to the witnesses' objection to what appears to be the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The witnesses argue that the District Court erroneously blamed them 
for the delays which occurred in scheduling a time for them to appear 
before the grand jury. We find no evidence in the record that attribution 
of blame on the issue of delay in any way affected the District Court's 
decision. 
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District Court's questioning of the sincerity of their beliefs 
and its attempt to interpret for itself the strictures of 
Orthodox Judaism, we note, first, that the government 
assumed that the witnesses had shown a substantial free 
exercise burden and, second, that the District Court 
assumed for purposes of decision both that the witnesses' 
religious beliefs were sincere and that testifying against 
their father would violate these beliefs. In light of the 
court's assumption, the witnesses were not injured by any 
skepticism the District Court may have expressed. 
 
B. 
 
The witnesses next complain that the government failed 
to establish a compelling interest in securing their 
testimony. The District Court found that the government 
has an interest in "investigating and successfully 
prosecuting crimes, which invariably includes taking the 
grand jury testimony of witnesses." App. at 61. Citing 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687-88 (1972), a case in 
which the Supreme Court refused to recognize under the 
First Amendment a blanket reporters' privilege to refuse to 
testify in grand jury proceedings, and the general principle 
that the "public has a right to every man's evidence . . . 
particularly . . . [in] grand jury proceedings," id. at 688, the 
District Court concluded that the government's interest was 
compelling. It stated, "That the government should 
investigate suspected criminal wrongdoing is essential and 
implements its paramount responsibility for the general 
safety and welfare of all its citizens." App. at 61. 
 
The witnesses contend that, rather than relying on 
Branzburg in basing its finding of a compelling state 
interest on the generalized need for criminal investigation, 
the court should have conducted a more particularized 
inquiry into the facts and circumstances of this case. They 
contend that the District Court was required to consider 
the nature of the investigation and the relationship between 
that investigation and the testimony sought before deciding 
whether the government's interest in questioning the 
witnesses was compelling. They assume that the crime 
under investigation is a revenue crime, rather than a 
capital one, and therefore assert that this fact reduces the 
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weight of the government's interest in investigation. The 
witnesses further contend that the criminal process is more 
of a burden on religious beliefs than civil or administrative 
processes because of the "dramatic" nature of the effect. 
Appellants' Br. at 35. In support they quote the portion of 
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith, where she wrote, 
"A neutral criminal law prohibiting conduct that a State 
may legitimately regulate is, if anything, more burdensome 
than a neutral civil statute placing legitimate conditions on 
the award of a state benefit." 494 U.S. at 898-99. 
 
Although the Supreme Court has not considered whether 
the government's interest in securing testimony pursuant to 
a grand jury subpoena is compelling, three courts of 
appeals have considered a similar issue under the law as it 
existed prior to Smith, and all three concluded that the 
government's interest in securing the particular evidence 
sought for the particular purposes alleged in those cases 
was compelling. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of John 
Doe, 842 F.2d 244, 247-48 (10th Cir. 1988); Port v. Heard, 
764 F.2d 423, 432-33 (5th Cir. 1985); Smilow v. United 
States, 465 F.2d 802, 804-05 (2d Cir.), vacated on other 
grounds, 409 U.S. 944 (1972). These cases remain a useful 
aid in interpreting RFRA in light of the expressed 
congressional intent to restore the status of the law before 
Smith. See Adams, 1999 WL 111126, at *4. 
 
In Smilow, a grand jury was investigating afire-bombing, 
which killed a young woman. Appellant, a 17-year-old high 
school student and a suspect in the bombing, refused to 
answer the grand jury's questions on the grounds that 
doing so would violate his faith as an observant Jew. The 
district court held the student in contempt, sentenced him 
to jail, and committed him to a federal detention center. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed, reasoning that the state has a compelling interest 
"in uncovering evidence of serious crimes of violence." 
Smilow, 465 F.2d at 804. 
 
In Port, Bernard and Odette Port were summoned before 
a state grand jury to give testimony about Bernard's 
natural son, David, the primary suspect in a murder the 
grand jury was investigating. When the Ports refused to 
testify, the state court held them in contempt and 
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sentenced them to jail. The Ports filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in federal court, arguing, inter alia, that, as 
observant Jews, they had the right under the Free Exercise 
Clause to refuse to testify against their son. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the Ports' 
argument, holding, "in the context of this case, the state's 
interest in procuring every person's testimony for the 
thorough investigation of the crime of homicide outweighs 
the Ports' First Amendment claims." Port, 764 F.2d at 432. 
 
The decision of the Tenth Circuit in Doe presents a 
situation parallel to the one before us: a 15-year-old 
Mormon child was given immunity and called to testify 
against a parent. He declined because "his deeply held 
religious beliefs" prohibited him from testifying against his 
mother or other members of his family. The court of 
appeals decided that the government's "compelling interest 
in investigating offenses against the criminal laws of the 
United States" outweighed the witness's free exercise rights. 
Doe, 842 F.2d at 248. These cases provide ample support 
for the District Court's decision. 
 
There are cases in which this court has recognized 
traditional common law testimonial privileges over the 
government's interest in securing grand jury testimony. 
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 
(3d Cir. 1990) ("Although there are countervailing 
considerations, we have no doubt that the need for 
protecting the [priest-penitent] relationship outweighs 
them."). However, in a recent decision, we refused to 
recognize a general parent-child testimonial privilege, see In 
re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1146-56 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom, Roe v. United States, 520 U.S. 1253 
(1997), thereby following the overwhelming majority of state 
and federal courts on that issue. 
 
We need not decide in this case whether the 
government's interest in investigating and prosecuting 
crime is always compelling under RFRA because we are 
convinced that the government's interest in securing the 
evidence needed to punish the criminal activity alleged here 
is compelling. The District Court correctly recognized that 
the duty to prosecute persons who commit serious crimes 
is part and parcel of the government's "paramount 
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responsibility for the general safety and welfare of all its 
citizens." App. at 61. Grand jury proceedings play an 
essential role in the government's ability to fulfill this duty. 
A review of the Schofield affidavit confirms both that the 
crimes that this grand jury is investigating are weighty and 
that these witnesses are likely to possess substantial 
relevant information. The dissent makes much of the fact 
that "[t]his is not a situation involving violence or 
disruption of public safety." Although it is true that this 
case does not concern crimes of extreme violence, such as 
those at issue in Port and Smilow, the crimes alleged here, 
like many white collar crimes, may seriously impact the 
public welfare. We therefore conclude that enforcing these 
subpoenas would serve a compelling state interest. 
 
C. 
 
RFRA imposes yet another requirement, i.e., that the 
government actions, here enforcing the grand jury 
subpoenas, must be the least restrictive means of serving 
the government's compelling interest. According to the 
witnesses, the subpoenas are not a narrowly drawn means 
to this end. They contend that the government can secure 
similar evidence from other sources and that, under RFRA, 
it has an obligation to do so. They insist that other 
witnesses can provide, and may already have provided, the 
same or similar evidence. And, they assert that"there are 
records that establish some of the operative facts." 
Appellants' Br. at 33. 
 
The government denies that "there were other means of 
obtaining the information." Appellee's Br. at 26. It further 
memorialized this denial in a sworn Schofield affidavit 
explaining the circumstances under investigation and the 
witnesses' relationship thereto, which affidavit was 
submitted under seal to the District Court in thefirst 
instance and to us on appeal. The District Court reviewed 
the affidavit in camera and found that the government 
needs the witnesses' testimony "with regard to their 
employment status . . . [and] the various business interests 
of the target." App. at 48. 
 
After reviewing the government's submission ourselves, 
we reach the same conclusion. There is substantial reason 
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to believe that the witnesses possess relevant information 
necessary for the prosecution of serious crimes. Their role 
as employees of the target of the investigation suggests that 
they are uniquely situated to have first-hand knowledge of 
the target's past business conduct. Moreover, the witnesses 
have submitted no evidence beyond their own self-serving 
allegations to contradict that suggestion or to establish that 
the government can conveniently obtain comparable 
information from other sources. 
 
The dissent's contentions to the contrary 
notwithstanding, see Dissenting Op. at 26-27, we do not 
suggest that the witnesses bore the burden of proving that 
less restrictive means were available. We merely point out 
that the evidence of record, which is contained in the 
government's sworn affidavit and which supports its 
position, remains uncontradicted. Although the witnesses 
were denied an evidentiary hearing, they were not denied 
an opportunity to submit evidence, as the dissent implies. 
See Dissenting Op. at 26-27. The witnesses were aware that 
they could submit evidence in the form of affidavits because 
they did submit an affirmation of Rabbi Feivel Cohen. 
Nothing prevented them from submitting affidavits 
concerning the availability of relevant business records or 
the potential testimony of other witnesses, which their 
counsel argue exist. 
 
The dissent contends that although we owe at least some 
deference to the District Court's conclusion, that conclusion 
was faulty because it relied on the untested affidavit of the 
prosecution. See Dissenting Opinion at 26. The dissent fails 
to note, however, that the affidavit was sworn by an 
Assistant United States Attorney, an officer of the court. 
Under these circumstances, there is nothing inappropriate 
about relying on the affidavit. We therefore conclude that, 
in this case, enforcing the subpoenas is the least restrictive 
means of advancing the government's compelling interest.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The witnesses rely on In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18355 
(D.Conn. 1982), which held that "the grand jury's particular interest in 
obtaining testimony from [the witness] against her daughter does not 
outweigh [the witness's] First Amendment interests" in freely exercising 
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IV. 
 
In addition to the substantive arguments discussed 
above, the witnesses raise several procedural objections to 
the District Court's determination. They argue that RFRA 
and pre-Smith precedent required the District Court to hold 
a hearing regarding the constitutionality and 
reasonableness of enforcing the subpoenas, and they claim 
that it was error under RFRA for the District Court to 
refuse to disclose the government's affidavit. 
 
A. 
 
The witnesses interpret RFRA, and the pre-Smith  
precedent that it draws on, to mandate an evidentiary 
hearing whenever a free exercise defense to the enforcement 
of a grand jury subpoena is raised. They cite language from 
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith suggesting that 
"the First Amendment at least requires a case-by-case 
determination . . . , sensitive to the facts of each particular 
claim," 494 U.S. at 899, as well as a passage from Justice 
Blackmun's dissent in which he states: "[T]his court's prior 
decisions have not allowed a government to rely on mere 
speculation about potential harms, but have demanded 
evidentiary support for a refusal to allow a religious 
exception." 494 U.S. at 911. 
 
There is a difference between requiring evidentiary 
support and requiring a hearing. Neither Supreme Court 
precedent nor our prior decisions require that a hearing be 
held whenever a subpoena is challenged on reasonableness 
grounds. Indeed, this court has specifically rejected any 
such suggestion, leaving the decision to hold a hearing to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
her religion. Id. at 584, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11. As a district 
court 
decision, this does not have the broader precedential value of an opinion 
by a court of appeals. Moreover, in addition to the differences in the 
factual situations (such as that the grand jury in Connecticut had little 
need for the mother's testimony as the daughter was not the target in 
that proceeding), the court acknowledged that "[i]n general . . . the 
interest of the grand jury in obtaining testimony must prevail over a 
witness's First Amendment religious rights." Id. at 583, 1982 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18355, at *10. 
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the district court's discretion. See In re Grand Jury Matter 
(District Council 33 Health & Welfare Fund), 770 F.2d 36, 39 
(3d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 
507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d Cir. 1975). Nor does precedent or 
policy require a different rule when the challenge is a 
constitutional one. 
 
In Schofield II, we explained the procedure that a district 
court must follow when asked to enforce a grand jury 
subpoena: 
 
        [T]he party seeking enforcement of a grand jury 
       subpoena [must] make some minimal showing by 
       affidavit of the existence of a proper purpose. . . . "[T]he 
       Government [is] required to . . . [show] that each item 
       is at least relevant to an investigation being conducted 
       by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, 
       and is not sought primarily for another purpose." 
 
        [Although] the burden is generally on the witness to 
       show abuse of the grand jury process, Schofield I 
       requires the government to present affidavits in every 
       case irrespective of whether the witness has challenged 
       the propriety of the subpoena. . . . 
 
        [W]here the district court is not satisfied with the 
       affidavits presented by the government, whether 
       because the matters set forth challenge the court's 
       credibility or because the witness has made some 
       colorable challenge to the affidavits, the court can 
       require something more. 
 
507 F.2d at 964-65 (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting 
Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 93). 
 
We went on to discuss the broad discretion a district 
court enjoys in exercising this supervisory role: 
 
        The district judge is vested with considerable 
       discretion in determining whether additional 
       proceedings are warranted. Various avenues of inquiry 
       are open to a court which questions the sufficiency of 
       the affidavits, among them discovery, in camera 
       inspection, additional affidavits and a hearing . . . . 
       [W]e emphasize . . . that the decision to require 
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       additional investigation is committed to the sound 
       discretion of the court. 
 
Id. at 965. We set forth the factors that should inform a 
district court's decision whether to order further inquiry 
into whether the government is abusing the subpoena 
process: 
 
        [T]he court must in deciding that request (for 
       additional proceedings,) weigh the quite limited scope 
       of an inquiry into abuse of the subpoena process, and 
       the potential for delay, against any need for additional 
       information which might cast doubt upon the accuracy 
       of the Government's representations. 
 
Id. (quoting Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 93). We treated "the 
realization that the grand jury must be given broad 
investigative powers" as a primary consideration in crafting 
appropriate procedures and rejected "any holding that 
would `saddle' a grand jury with minitrials . . . [thereby] 
imped[ing] its investigative duty." Id.  at 966. Finally, we 
emphasized that our review of a district court's 
determination would be deferential: "We will not disturb a 
decision to deny additional review unless we find that the 
district court's `weighing' was an abuse of discretion." Id. at 
965. 
 
The same considerations are applicable here; therefore, 
similar procedures are appropriate. The District Court had 
a duty to satisfy itself that the witnesses' testimony was 
necessary to serve the government's compelling interest 
without unduly delaying or interfering with the functioning 
of the grand jury. The government bore responsibility for 
establishing the propriety of enforcing the subpoenas. We 
therefore conclude that the submission of a Schofield 
affidavit was a suitable means for the government to fulfill 
its obligation. And, we hold that, in deciding whether to 
order further proceedings, it was appropriate for the 
District Court to weigh the same factors outlined in 
Schofield I and Schofield II: the scope of inquiry (here under 
RFRA), the potential for delay, and "any need for additional 
information which might cast doubt upon the accuracy of 
the Government's representations." Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 
965; Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 93. Because, weighing these 
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factors in this case, we cannot say it was an abuse of 
discretion for the District Court not to order further 
inquiry, we will not disturb its determination. 
 
The dissent misinterprets our statement that "similar 
procedures are appropriate" to mean that the same 
substantive standard applies whenever a grand jury 
subpoena is challenged, whether on abuse of process or 
First Amendment grounds. Lest there be any confusion, we 
reiterate: in deciding whether to enforce a grand jury 
subpoena over a RFRA objection, the district court must 
satisfy itself that the witness's testimony is necessary to 
serve a compelling state interest. In its discretion, the 
district court may permit the government, which bears the 
burden of proving the existence of a compelling purpose 
and the unavailability of less restrictive means, to meet that 
burden through the ex parte in camera submission of a 
sworn affidavit. 
 
The witnesses argue that, although the procedures set 
forth above may be appropriate in the context of an abuse 
of process inquiry, RFRA heightens the need for a hearing. 
They point to RFRA's requirement of individualized 
judgments and a balancing of facts and circumstances in 
every case, and they note that RFRA shifts the burden of 
proof to the government. 
 
It is true that our past decisions have relied in part on a 
division of the burdens of proof that does not apply under 
RFRA. For example, in District Council 33, we upheld the 
district court's decision to enforce a subpoena without 
requiring an evidentiary hearing on the grounds that 
"[g]rand jury proceedings are entitled to`a presumption of 
regularity' " and that "the party objecting to the 
enforcement of a grand jury subpoena has the burden of 
demonstrating some irregularity in those proceedings." 770 
F.2d at 40 (quoting Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 92). In doing so, 
we reaffirmed our previous holding that " `the decision to 
require additional investigation' beyond the Schofield 
affidavit, `is committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court.' " Id. at 39 (quoting Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 
965). 
 
Under RFRA, the government, rather than the party 
challenging the subpoena, bears the burden of proof as to 
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compelling interest and least restrictive means. Nothing in 
this different distribution of the burdens of proof, however, 
undercuts our determination that similar procedures are 
appropriate. The fact that the witnesses did not bear the 
burden of proof on the issues they sought to explore by a 
hearing makes it less, not more, likely that they were 
injured by the District Court's denial of that request. We 
thus reject the witnesses' claim that an evidentiary hearing 
is always required under RFRA. Of course, we do not 
suggest that an evidentiary hearing would never be 
required when the party subpoenaed claims both a 
substantial burden on his or her religious beliefs and either 
the absence of a compelling government interest or the 
availability of a less restrictive alternative. We merely hold 
that in this case the District Court, which had the 
discretion to decide, did not abuse that discretion in 
rejecting the request. 
 
B. 
 
In addition to seeking an evidentiary hearing, the 
witnesses' counsel requested a copy of the government's 
Schofield affidavit, which request the District Court denied. 
The witnesses challenge that denial on appeal, noting that 
"[i]n Schofield, the affidavit was not only turned over to the 
defense, it was replicated in the body of the opinion." 
Appellants' Br. at 43. They ask this court (without making 
a formal motion) to "order that [the affidavit] be turned over 
and permit a supplementary brief by the petitioners to 
address its application to the merits." Id. at 44. We find no 
merit to the witnesses' challenge and will deny their 
request. 
 
We have consistently endorsed the use of in camera 
proceedings to preserve grand jury secrecy. In re Grand 
Jury, 103 F.3d at 1145 ("Ex parte in camera hearings have 
been held proper in order to preserve the ongoing interest 
in grand jury secrecy."); In the Matter of Grand Jury 
Empaneled Oct. 18, 1979 (Hughes), 633 F.2d 282, 288 (3d 
Cir. 1980). This procedure is consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 
U.S. 292, 302 (1991). 
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Our decision in In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 
1997), resolved a similar issue under similar 
circumstances. A 16-year-old, asserting a parent-child 
privilege, moved to quash a grand jury subpoena seeking to 
elicit her testimony about her father's involvement in an 
alleged kidnaping. The district court held a hearing and 
ordered additional briefing "on the issue of whether the 
daughter's testimony would be material and non- 
duplicative," and it required the government to"make a 
substantial showing that this threshold was met." Id. at 
1143 & n.6 (citation omitted). The government filed a 
Schofield affidavit and voluntarily furnished further 
particulars at an in camera ex parte hearing. Based on 
these in camera and ex parte submissions, the district 
court concluded, " `the government's interests in compelling 
the testimony outweigh the privacy interests asserted by 
the moving parties' and denied the motion to quash on 
those grounds." Id. at 1144. We affirmed on appeal, stating: 
 
        [W]e find little merit in the arguments . . . pertaining 
       to the Schofield affidavit and the in camera proceedings 
       before the district court. . . . Ex parte in camera 
       hearings have been held proper in order to preserve the 
       ongoing interest in grand jury secrecy. The secrecy of 
       the grand jury proceedings in the present matter might 
       have been compromised by divulging the specific 
       questions that the government intended to ask during 
       the daughter's testimony. Judicial supervision and 
       interference with grand jury proceedings should always 
       be kept to a minimum. . . . We hold that the district 
       court did not abuse its discretion in hearing the 
       government's proffer in camera and ex parte. 
 
Id. at 1145-46 (citations omitted). 
 
The only relevant difference we can see between In re 
Grand Jury and this case is that the witnesses there based 
their claims on the need to protect the parent-child 
relationship, whereas here the witnesses assert religious 
beliefs in support of their privilege claims. The question 
remaining then is whether more protective procedures are 
mandated when a claim to privilege is based on religious 
beliefs than when it is based on secular beliefs about the 
same parent-child relationship. 
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The witnesses argue that more protective procedures are 
required because they view RFRA as "amending" Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) to ease the stringency of 
grand jury secrecy in order to assure the witnesses a 
meaningful opportunity to contest the burden on their free 
exercise of religion. RFRA, however, does not purport to 
amend the rule of grand jury secrecy. To the extent there is 
a substantial burden on the witnesses' free exercise of 
religion, it is created by the grand jury subpoena and not 
by the maintenance of grand jury secrecy. And, although 
we have accepted the substantiality of the burden alleged, 
we have concluded that in light of the government's 
compelling need and the unavailability of less restrictive 
alternatives, the subpoenas can be enforced. 
 
V. 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court holding the witnesses in contempt. In light of 
the impending expiration of the grand jury, the mandate 
shall issue forthwith. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues. 
I do not believe the government satisfied its burden of 
proving that requiring these witnesses to testify against 
their father in violation of what we assume to be a devoutly 
held religious belief is the least restrictive means of 
furthering the government's purported compelling interest 
in this investigation. For the reasons that follow, I believe 
that we should remand to the district court for an ex parte 
hearing. Following that hearing the district court can 
determine if disclosure of the affidavit and further 
proceedings are warranted. It is only after such a probing, 
fact-specific inquiry that the district court can properly 
conduct the weighing that is required under RFRA. Absent 
at least an ex parte hearing, there is no way to insure the 
compelling nature of the government's inquiry or that there 
is no less intrusive way to gather the evidence the 
government is seeking. Forcing these witnesses to testify 
without requiring such a showing is inconsistent with 
Congress's attempt "to restore the compelling interest test" 
to enforce generally applied rules over conflicting religious 
beliefs. See Maj. Op. at 4. 
 
I. 
 
The majority cites Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802, 
804-05 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 944 
(1972); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 432-33 (5th Cir. 1985); 
and In re Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe, 842 F.2d 
244, 247-48 (10th Cir. 1988), to conclude that "[t]hese 
cases remain a useful aid in interpreting RFRA in light of 
the expressed congressional intent to restore the status of 
the law before Smith." See Maj. Op. at 8. However, I do not 
think those cases support the majority's analysis. 
 
Although a religious objection was the basis of a 
challenge to a grand jury subpoena in Smilow, I believe that 
case argues for, not against, granting a hearing here. The 
same is true of Port v. Heard. In both cases, grand juries 
were investigating serious crimes of violence resulting in 
death. In Port, the grand jury subpoenaed the parents of a 
suspect in an effort to get them to supply information that 
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could be used to indict their son for murder; in Smilow, the 
grand jury subpoenaed a 17-year old potential witness in a 
fatal fire bombing. Both witnesses asserted a privilege 
against testifying based on their First Amendment freedom 
of religion.1 Although the Courts of Appeals for the Second 
and Fifth Circuits ruled against the witnesses, both courts 
were careful to limit the scope of their holdings to the facts 
of the particular case. In Port, the court stated: 
 
       We hold that in the context of this case, the states's 
       interest in procuring every person's testimony for the 
       thorough investigation of the crime of homicide  
       outweighs the Ports' First Amendment claims, but only 
       if the state's procurement of the testimony was `the 
       least restrictive means of achieving' that interest. 
 
764 F.2d at 432 (emphasis added). Similarly, the court in 
Smilow noted "the compelling state interest in this case in 
uncovering serious crimes of violence." 465 F.2d at 804. 
Thus, although the language in Smilow, Port, and their 
progeny provides some basis for the majority's holding, I 
am concerned that the majority has expanded those cases 
beyond the point supported by those courts' opinions. 
 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), is the 
foundation for many of the cases relied upon by the 
majority, including Smilow and Port. However, those cases 
rely upon the language of Branzburg without giving 
adequate consideration to the facts of that case, or the 
actual holding of the Supreme Court. In Branzburg, the 
Court considered the consolidated appeals of several 
different reporters who had independently been subpoenaed 
in connection with unrelated grand jury investigations. The 
various investigations included allegations of drug 
trafficking, civil unrest, and even Presidential 
assassination. The reporters argued that the First 
Amendment guarantee of Free Speech and Free Press 
implicitly established a qualified privilege against disclosing 
news sources. The Court summarized the reporters' 
argument as follows: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The parents in Port also asserted a parent-child privilege based on 
their fundamental right of privacy and the Equal Protection Clause. 
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       Petitioners . . . press First Amendment claims that may 
       be simply put: that to gather news it is often necessary 
       to agree either not to identify the source of information 
       published or to publish only part of the facts revealed, 
       or both; that if the reporter is nevertheless forced to 
       reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the source so 
       identified and other confidential sources of other 
       reporters will be measurably deterred from furnishing 
       publishable information, all to the detriment of the free 
       flow of information protected by the First Amendment. 
       Although the newsmen in these cases do not claim an 
       absolute privilege against official interrogation in all 
       circumstances, they assert that the reporter should not 
       be forced either to appear or to testify before a grand 
       jury or at trial until and unless sufficient grounds are 
       shown for believing that the reporter possesses 
       information relevant to a crime the grand jury is 
       investigating, that the information the reporter has is 
       unavailable from other sources, and that the need for 
       the information is sufficiently compelling to override 
       the claimed invasion of First Amendment interests 
       occasioned by the disclosure. 
 
408 U.S. at 679-80. The Court held that no such privilege 
exists. In so holding, the Court noted that had it recognized 
such a conditional privilege, the privilege would require 
courts to conduct a fact-specific analysis each time a 
reporter was subpoenaed: 
 
       In each instance where a reporter is subpoenaed to 
       testify, the courts would also be embroiled in 
       preliminary factual and legal determinations with 
       respect to whether the proper predicate had been laid 
       for the reporter's appearance: Is there probable cause 
       to believe a crime has been committed? Is it likely that 
       the reporter has useful information gained in 
       confidence? Could the grand jury obtain the 
       information elsewhere? Is the official interest sufficient 
       to outweigh the claimed privilege? 
 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 795. The Court reasoned that 
Congress was free to determine whether a statutory 
newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable, id. at 706, 
but until Congress did so, reporters were not entitled to 
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resist grand jury subpoenas on First Amendment grounds. 
The Court stated: 
 
       [a]lthough the powers of the grand jury are not 
       unlimited and are subject to the supervision of a judge, 
       the longstanding principle that `the public . . . has a 
       right to every man's evidence,' except for those persons 
       protected by a constitutional, common-law, or 
       statutory privilege, is particularly applicable to grand 
       jury proceedings. 
 
Id. at 688 (emphasis added). 
 
RFRA creates the privilege absent in Branzburg, and the 
cases relying upon it. Thus, Branzburg is of dubious 
assistance to our inquiry. In Branzburg, as well as the other 
cases where claims of privilege have been struck down 
because the law did not recognize the particular privilege, 
there was no weighing of interests because there was 
nothing to weigh on the witnesses' side of the balance. 
Under RFRA's statutory framework, however, Congress 
expressly requires the government to prove that it has a 
compelling governmental interest and that enforcing a 
grand jury subpoena is the least restrictive means for 
furthering that interest.2 Therefore, I do not believe we can 
determine whether coercing the testimony in this case 
satisfies RFRA's dictates without requiring a hearing to 
determine whether the government can meet its burdens.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Indeed, in Branzburg, the Supreme Court never applied the fact- 
intensive "least restrictive means" test required by RFRA; rather, the 
Court merely noted that compelling the testimony in that case "bears a 
reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental 
purpose." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 700. Thus, Branzburg provides no 
guidance for determining whether the fact-specific, statutory "least 
restrictive means" test is satisfied. 
 
3. On remand, I would leave it to the district court's discretion to 
decide 
whether a full evidentiary hearing after disclosure of the Schofield 
affidavit is required, or whether the ex parte hearing will suffice. The 
ex 
parte hearing would involve probing into the nature of the alleged crime 
and the precise conduct alleged to be criminal, the specific testimony 
sought from the witnesses, whether other witnesses exist, and if so, who 
they are and what they will likely testify to, whether the government has 
already interviewed other witnesses, and if so, the nature of their 
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The Court in Branzburg did state, in dicta, that "[t]he 
requirement of those cases which hold that a State's 
interest must be compelling or paramount to justify even 
an indirect burden on First Amendment rights, are also met 
here." 408 U.S. at 700 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). The Court then explained: 
 
       If the test is that the government `convincingly show a 
       substantial relation between the information sought 
       and a subject of overriding and compelling state 
       interest,' it is quite apparent . . . that the State has the 
       necessary interest in extirpating the traffic in illegal 
       drugs, in forestalling assassination attempts on the 
       President, and in preventing the community from being 
       disrupted by violent disorders endangering both 
       persons and property. . . 
 
Id. at 701. That is not our case. The violent nature of the 
crimes being investigated in Branzburg was an important 
factor in the Court's conclusion; thus, to the extent that the 
Court's mention of the "compelling interest test" provides 
precedent for our analysis at all, neither the district court 
nor the majority opinion gives adequate consideration to 
the nature of the charges here. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
testimony, whether documentary evidence might exist and whether it will 
corroborate witness testimony, whether the government can obtain 
personal financial statements of the three children, and any other facts 
that may shed light on the government's need for the testimony. 
 
With respect to disclosure of the Schofield affidavit, I believe the 
district court should also weigh the government's interest in secrecy in 
this particular case against the witnesses' substantial interests in 
arguing their position. At oral argument, the government asserted that it 
opposed disclosure of the Schofield affidavit in this case because such 
disclosure could result in the fabrication of testimony or evidence. That 
is, of course, a risk in any prosecution involving the testimony of 
witnesses, and there are sanctions for such conduct including 
prosecution for perjury. Thus, I fail to see how the government's concern 
for perjury outweighs the witnesses' substantial interest in reviewing the 
affidavit to determine whether some alternative, less restrictive means 
for 
furthering the governmental interest exists. Nevertheless, here, I would 
leave the disclosure decision up to the district court following an ex 
parte 
hearing. 
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Smilow and Port only highlight the distinctions between 
Branzburg and this case. See Maj. Op. at 8-9. In Smilow, 
the witness resisting a grand jury subpoena in a fatal fire 
bombing investigation claimed that he was an " `observant 
and committed Jew' [and therefore] must refuse to answer 
the grand jury questions or else suffer `Divine punishment 
and ostracism from the Jewish Community' as an 
`informer.' " 465 F.2d at 804. However, the privilege that he 
asserted was not recognized under law at the time. 4 The 
court noted: "The legal claim is apparently a novel one and 
its precise religious basis is not clear from the record before 
us." Id. The court then relied in part upon Branzburg to 
find a compelling state interest that overcame the religious 
objection. The court stated: "[W]e do not believe that 
appellant's right to refuse to answer highly relevant 
questions is any greater than those claimed by petitioners 
in Branzburg, in the face of the compelling state interest in 
this case in uncovering evidence of serious crimes of 
violence." Id. 
 
The courts in Smilow and Port also relied largely on the 
fact that the crimes being investigated by the grand jury 
involved extreme violence. The court in Smilow explained: 
"we believe that appellant's first amendment claim is 
outweighed by the compelling state interest in having the 
grand jury hear `every man's evidence' bearing on alleged 
criminal activity that resulted in the death of an innocent 
person." 465 F.2d at 805 (citing Branzburg) (emphasis 
added). Similarly, in Port, the court repeatedly recognized 
the need for a complete investigation because the 
underlying crime involved a murder. See, e.g., 764 F.2d at 
432 ("in the context of this case, the state's interest in 
procuring every person's testimony for the thorough 
investigation of the crime of homicide outweighs the Ports' 
First Amendment claims"); id. at 433 ("First Amendment 
interests may be subjugated to [the state's interest in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Similarly, when Port was decided no parent-child privilege was 
recognized under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or 
the fundamental right to privacy. Texas had recognized a marital 
privilege, but not a parental privilege. The court held that "[t]he right 
to 
refuse to testify against one's child is not a fundamental right. Nor does 
the distinction between the marital and parental privileges involve a 
suspect class." 764 F.2d at 431. 
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discovering the truth about a crime] in the proper 
circumstances" and holding that pursuing investigation of a 
murder presents proper circumstances) (emphasis added). 
 
Given the nonviolent nature of the crimes being 
investigated here, I am far more reluctant than my 
colleagues to rely on precedent where the courts were 
obviously influenced by the violent nature of the crimes 
being investigated. 
 
II. 
 
Absent an ex parte hearing at the very least, I remain 
unconvinced that the underlying crimes here justify a rule 
elevating the government's claimed compelling interest over 
the religious rights of these witnesses. This is not to say 
that the crimes being investigated are not serious, or that 
they are not worthy of prosecution. Rather, I submit that 
the nature of the investigation here has not been properly 
placed on the RFRA scale. Indeed, it does not appear to 
have been considered at all. This is not a situation involving 
violence or disruption or a threat to public safety. Indeed, 
it does not even appear that the alleged crimes are 
continuing. Rather, it is an investigation into past conduct. 
The majority asserts that "[t]he District Court correctly 
recognized that the duty to prosecute persons who commit 
serious crimes is part and parcel of the government's 
`paramount responsibility for the general safety and welfare 
of all its citizens.' " See Maj. Op. at 9-10. But the record 
simply does not establish that the "general safety and 
welfare" of the citizenry is implicated here. 
 
Moreover, I do not believe that the deference we owe to 
the district court's conclusion justifies upholding the 
deference it showed to the untested affidavit of the 
prosecution, as opposed to taking adequate steps to protect 
the religious rights asserted by the witnesses and protected 
under RFRA. The majority states, "the witnesses have 
submitted no evidence beyond their own self-serving 
allegations to contradict [the suggestion that, as employees, 
they are uniquely situated to have first hand knowledge] or 
to establish that the government can conveniently obtain 
comparable information from other sources." Maj. Op. at 
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11. However, the witnesses do not dispute that they may 
possess relevant information; nor do they deny (or confirm) 
that they were employees of the target (although it is 
unclear why that makes them "uniquely situated" compared 
to other employees). Instead, the witnesses argue that the 
government has failed to establish that similarly probative 
information cannot be obtained elsewhere, either from other 
witnesses or through documentary evidence, without 
burdening their religious beliefs. 
 
In addition, the majority's approach shifts the 
government's burden under RFRA to the witnesses. This is 
exacerbated by the "Catch 22" in which the witnesses are 
ensnared. They have made only bare and unsupported 
assertions because they have been denied a hearing, and 
are therefore forced to shoot blindly at an affidavit they 
have not seen. Yet, the majority partially relies on their 
inability to assert more than bald allegations to affirm the 
district court's refusal to grant them a hearing. 
 
The majority's analysis suggests that the procedures 
routinely used to review grand jury subpoenas under 
Schofield are necessarily adequate to review RFRA 
challenges. I can not agree. In Schofield II , we held, "[T]he 
Government [is] required to . . . [show] that each item is at 
least relevant to an investigation being conducted by the 
grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is not 
sought primarily for another purpose." In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963, 966 (3rd Cir. 1975). Such an 
inquiry is totally inadequate to afford the protections 
Congress intended under RFRA. The usual Schofield 
affidavit does not establish the compelling nature of the 
government's interest nor address whether there are 
alternative means of obtaining the evidence.5 That is not 
the purpose of the Schofield affidavit; rather, it merely 
seeks to insure that the subpoena process is not being 
abused. To the extent we hold that a Schofield inquiry is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In fairness to the government, and to its credit, the affidavit that 
was 
submitted here is far more specific than the usual boilerplate that is 
pasted into a Schofield affidavit. However, the procedure utilized here is 
inadequate to insuring that the government can satisfy both prongs of 
RFRA. 
 
                                26 
  
sufficient under RFRA, we lower the statutory bar Congress 
has erected. Indeed, we may well eliminate that bar as the 
Schofield inquiry does not address the compelling need of 
the prosecutor nor the existence of alternative avenues of 
investigation at all. Therefore, I disagree with the 
conclusion that "similar procedures are appropriate." See 
Maj. Op. at 14. An inquiry along the lines set out in 
Schofield may be necessary for the government to meet its 
burden under RFRA, but it is by no means sufficient to do 
so. 
 
Thus, I fear that our holding today will have the 
unintended consequence of creating a per se rule that will 
preclude a court from ever concluding that there is a less 
restrictive means for obtaining information than actually 
compelling grand jury testimony. At oral argument before 
the district court, the district court essentially held that to 
satisfy its burden in any criminal investigation the 
government merely has to assert that it has a compelling 
interest in "pursu[ing] all avenues in the search for the 
truth in a criminal investigation," app. at 48 (emphasis 
added), and that there is no practical alternative. We now 
endorse that low threshold by holding that so long as 
"[t]here is substantial reason to believe that the witnesses 
possess relevant information necessary for the prosecution 
of serious crimes," enforcing the subpoena is the least 
restrictive means of advancing the government's compelling 
interest in protecting "the general safety and welfare of all 
its citizens." See Maj. Op. at 10-11 & 10. 
 
We are told that these witnesses will be forced to commit 
a grave sin under the tenets of their religion, and we 
assume that is so. It is a sin for which there is no 
atonement. Yet, we do not even grant an ex parte hearing 
to make the government prove that the need for their 
testimony is sufficiently compelling and the alternatives so 
nonexistent as to justify this affront to their religion under 
RFRA. The language of RFRA, and the First Amendment 
doctrine from which RFRA evolved, require more. See, e.g., 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) ("courts must 
move with great circumspection in performing the sensitive 
and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social 
concern when faced with religious claims for exemption 
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from generally applicable [laws]" and noting particularized 
showing as to the adequacy of the alternatives); 
Employment Div. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 899 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Even if, as 
an empirical matter, a government's criminal laws might 
usually serve a compelling interest in health, safety, or 
public order, the First Amendment requires a case-by-case 
determination of the question, sensitive to the facts of each 
particular claim. . . ."). 
 
Because I believe the government's Schofield affidavit 
alone does not satisfy those burdens, and the district 
court's scrutiny was wholly inadequate, I would remand for 
a more searching examination of the government's need for 
the testimony in this particular case and a determination of 
whether alternatives might exist. Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
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